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Nothing is more shoddy or disillusioning than the "civilized" con-
science and its attitude toward war. The motivation for a successful war
involves killing people. In a state of nonwar, killing another human being
is regarded as the worst of all crimes-often the only crime which the law
recognizes as justifying counterkilling or homicide. Oft times, counter-
killing takes a place with judicial murder or capital punishment. However,
when nation states are aggressor defenders or the act of killing becomes
cloaked with nobility and patriotism, then the greatest killers are the most
decorated, admired, and honored.
Part of planning for war is the dehumanization of defenseless civil-
ians in uniform-prisoners of war. They become members of the wrong
creed, class, or race. Degradation and extermination become crimes against
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Professor, Yale Law School; Chairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee, World Peace
Through Law Center; former Consul, Ecuador; former Consul General, Guatemala; former
Special Counsel to the Attorney General of Illinois; author of numerous law journal articles
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decency and humanity which become the common stuff of history. It is
naive and foolhardy to imagine that, in the age of outer space and inner
space explorations, mankind has become gentler and more tolerant. The
crimes of the Germans of the World War II were atrocious by any low
standard in history. The crimes against civilians and prisoners of war
become all the more horrendous as having been done in the era of the
twentieth century encased in the trappings of what is termed, euphemis-
tically, "civilization." At some time or other, man will have to wrestle with
the problem that aggressive war is not to be carried over to aggressive
degradations and extermination of helpless prisoners of war. To do less
would be grotesque. The German jailers all adopted an air of self-
righteousness and self-exoneration when brought before the several war
tribunals. The wickedness of the Germans against military prisoners of
war-excluding the civilians-were acts considered gross even amidst the
basic wickedness of war. Postwar prosecution is not an antidote for pro-
phylactic rules of law anticipating international warfare as a seeming
natural state of humanity. If the lawlessness committed against prisoners
of war was an act of state, then the entire state should have been on trial
and probably condemned, so that actual political life would cease to exist
-but such is not the case. Postwar indignation against war criminals and
their accomplices is a tiresome confession of the bankruptcy of all man-
kind. A high standard of behavior and morality must be established. This
rule of conduct can only be buttressed by the rule of law.
Hence, this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution toward the conferring of rights upon the individual
in international law began in part with the development of the rules of
war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 recognized that war prisoners and persons residing in
enemy occupied territories retained certain rights vis-h-vis the occupying
power. Thus, for the first time, the individual was recognized as having a
status in international law. With the war crime trials following World
War II, the position of the individual was given further recognition, as
he was now to be held personally responsible for the commission of cer-
tain acts.
If the rights of the individual were to be protected during war, it
logically followed that human rights should be given international recog-
nition in time of peace. After World War I, individual rights were pro-
tected by the League of Nations Mandate arrangements, the Minorities
Treaties involving the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the
International Labor Organization Conventions. The shocking disregard
for human -rights by the Axis Powers during World War II precipitated
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an even greater concern for the international protection of the individual
as evidenced by the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and
other conventions and declarations.
But in most instances involving the protection of human rights, there
is no effective means for the individual to assert his position. He must
depend upon a nation state to act on his behalf; and, to this extent, he
remains an object rather than a subject of international law. As such, his
status is that of a slave. Only by providing a mechanism for asserting his
rights can the "ought's," or categorical imperatives, of international law
as affecting human rights be transformed into an "is."'
The effective remedy for the individual to assert his rights under
international law is by means of the writ of World Habeas Corpus.2 With
the writ of Habeas Corpus, which stems from the thirty-ninth clause of
the Magna Carta, an individual who is unlawfully detained or punished
may compel his jailer to release him. The principle of Habeas Corpus is
recognized in both the Common and Civil law systems, while in Latin
America Amparo plays a similar role.' Under World Habeas Corpus, an
1. Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of International Law?, 34 U. Cnr.
L. REv. 341 (1965).
2. Comment, World Habeas Corpus, 7 INDIAN L.Q. REv. 1173 (1962); Brennan, Inter-
national Due Process and the Law, 108 CoiiG. REc. A6774 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1962);
Kefauver, International Due Process and The Law, 108 CoNG. REC. A6774 (daily ed. Sept.
13, 1962) ; Kutner, World Habeas Corpus for International Man: A Credo for International
Due Process of Law, 36 U. DET. L.J. 235 (1959); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and
International Extradition, International Bar Association (1964); Kutner, World Habeas
Corpus: The Legal Ultimate for the Unity of Mankind, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW 570 (1965).
3. United Nations, SEMna oN AmPAxo, HABEAS CoRus AND OTHER SE AR
REMEDIES (1961).
There are chilling reports that the North Vietnamese are systematically brain-
washing hundreds of American soldiers. Amid fanfare, they are brought from
secret cells, trodded through anti-American confessions and like Pavlovian dogs
salivating on cue are rewarded when they cooperate, punished when they don't.
Neither Hanoi nor the Vietcong have provided lists of names or numbers of
prisoners as required by the 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Ameri-
can estimates are more than 158 Air Force and Navy fliers who are imprisoned in
North Vietnam, more than 300 who are missing and possibly held captive, for a
total of 458 who are missing in the North. In South Vietnam, there are 21 United
States soldier prisoners of war, with 128 missing, for a total of 149.
Ho Chi Minh regards Americans in his hands as war criminals covered by the
1945 Nuremberg Charter. When Ho signed the Convention in 1957, like other
signatories, he added a reservation. His declaration was: "That prisoners of war
prosecuted and convicted for war crimes or for crimes against humanity, in
accordance with the principles laid down by the Nuremberg Court of Justice,
shall not benefit from the present Convention . .. .
Ho claims that the United States violates Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
which covers "crimes against peace," including "waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances." When Ho
threatened to try the Americans as war criminals, a worldwide revulsion against the
idea-including appeals from Pope Paul VI and U Thant-made him pause. But
Ho still clings to his legal right, as he sees it, to do so. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross are forbidden to visit persons in North Vietnam. LooX,
July 25, 1967 at 53-55.
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individual who is deprived of his rights without due process of law could,
after the exhaustion of available domestic remedies, file a writ of appeal
to a regional international tribunal with ultimate appeal to a world court.
Under a system of World Habeas Corpus, nine regional tribunals
would be established reflecting the cultural constituents of differing legal
systems, including a Communist-Orient Circuit consisting of Communist
China, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia, and North Korea; the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics-Eastern European Circuit; the Western
European Circuit, which would also encompass the states of Great Britain,
Iceland, Ireland, Cyprus, Crete, Israel, and Algeria; the Islamic Circuit;
the Southern African Circuit; the Non-Communist Orient Circuit; the
Austral-Oceana Circuit; the Latin-American Circuit; and the Anglo-Amer-
ican Circuit.
World Habeas Corpus, as a buckler and shield to protect individual
rights, is peculiarly suited as a remedy to protect the rights of prisoners
of war as recognized in international law by the Geneva Convention of
1949. These rights cannot be effectively protected by a domestic tribunal,
especially in war time, when the availability of an impartial and objective
hearing cannot be assured. Persons who are punished for having breached
the Convention by treating prisoners inhumanely are usually from the
side which was defeated in the conflict and are tried by a tribunal com-
prised of the victors, a tribunal which cannot be regarded as impartial.
Therefore, the rights of prisoners of war can only be effectively protected
though the availability of means for appeal to an impartial international
tribunal through the invocation of a writ of World Habeas Corpus.
However, while in regard to other instances for the protection of
human rights appeal would be made to regionally constituted tribunals,
the preferred approach regarding the rights of war prisoners should be to
provide for appeal to a single international tribunal. The provisions of the
The growing feeling that prisoners of war are forgotten men and that no one
speaks for their freedom has caused the Congress to be concerned, at least academi-
cally. It has been suggested that it should be declared war, so that the Geneva
Convention would come into play. CONG. REC., A3786 (daily ed. July 26, 1967).
Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells aids that captured Americans are not
prisoners but hostages, that the Communists would demand a quid pro quo for
treating them decently and that he has no intention of granting any concessions.
Chicago Daily News, Aug. 8, 1967, at 14.
Compensation for American prisoners of war and civilian internees taken
prisoner during the Vietnam War has been put in legislative form by the United
States Senate, S.2260. Cong. Rec., SI179-87 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1967).
The sponsor of the Bill estimates that as many as 700 Americans are held
prisoners in North and South Vietnam; that the compensation for prisoners follow-
ing World War II provided $2.50 per day to military prisoners and $60 per month
for civilian internees was inadequate,--the identical payment structure for prison-
ers held during the Korean War. The Bill, summarized, would establish the mem-
bers of the Armed Forces a total of $3.00 per day based upon forced labor or in-
human treatment. Civilian internees will be paid at the rate of $75 per month if
they are over the age of 18 and $30 per month if they are under the age of 18.
The settlement would be made by the War Claims Settlement Commission with a
statutory limitation period of three years following the date of release. Id.
[VOL.. XXI
INTERNATIONAL HABEAS CORPUS
Geneva Convention of 1949 require uniform interpretation, which can be
best achieved by a single tribunal. Furthermore, the individuals involved
are likely to be nationals from different cultures invoking universally rec-
ognized principles. The law regarding the treatment of war prisoners is
not peculiar to any culture or legal system.
Ever recurring international situations are particularly conducive for
the establishment of an international tribunal to protect the rights of
prisoners of war. The presence of thermonuclear weapons of mass annihila-
tion makes total war unfeasible and requires that all armed conflicts be
limited in scope, as in Korea and Vietnam. The adversaries must adhere
to certain rules and recognize that there are certain limits beyond which
they may not escalate a conflict.
An international tribunal to protect the rights of prisoners of war and
to implement the Geneva Conventions could function as a mechanism to
limit the scope and intensity of armed conflicts. Such a tribunal could
act as a check to prevent an adversary from so shockingly mistreating
prisoners as to evoke a dangerous escalation. Conceivably, it could also
constitute a step toward the establishment of a legal mechanism for the
adjudication of conflicts and the elimination of the prevailing irrational
reliance on violence.
This paper traces the historical development of rules regarding the
treatment of prisoners of war, presents an analysis of the Geneva Con-
vention of 1949, and considers the means by which World Habeas Corpus
could be utilized to implement its provisions.
II. THE GENEVA CONVENTION
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War' was drafted in April 1949 by delegates from fifty-nine nations with
the hope that its high principles would ensure more humanitarian treat-
ment of prisoners of war than was evidenced by the many barbarisms,
4. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364 (effective in the United States, Feb. 2,
1956). An excellent bibliography on this subject is contained in R. HINGORANI, PRISONERS
OF WAR (1963). [hereinafter cited as HINGORANI].
On Nov. 2, North Korean soldiers crossed the demilitarized zone and murdered
six American soldiers and one South Korean. After killing them, to quote Maj. Gen.
Richard G. Cicollela, "they smashed the heads of the dead men with such savage
brutality as to render all recognition impossible."
Since President Johnson's Pacific trip there have been 10 North Korean attacks
along the armistice line. How many more years of this do we have to put up
with? ... Americans are [being] killed or kidnaped or imprisoned by Communists
the world over.
We still don't have all the American prisoners returned from the Korean war;
Cuba has murdered Americans and has American citizens in her prisons.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States, in its report on communist Cuba on Oct. 28 [1966] reported acts
of torture of prisoners, arbitrary extraction of blood from those condemned to
death, to the point that people had to be tied in an upright position to be executed.
Editorial, Chicago American, January 8, 1967.
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
outrages, and atrocities committed during World War II. Sixty-one na-
tions, including the United States, affixed their signatures between August
12, 1949, and February 12, 1950. The Convention was part of the modern
movement for a world rule of law protecting human rights; and, as such,
it is a noteworthy contribution to the development of international law
and the international protection of human rights. It proclaims the dignity
and worth of persons even when they find themselves in one of the lowest
of human situations-captivity. Through its technical, specific and con-
crete provisions, it attempts to translate into reality the basic concepts of
due process of law and the rights of man. Despite the exigencies and emo-
tionally charged environment concomitant to a state of war, belligerents
are affirmatively obliged by the Convention's provisions to protect the
safety, health, and mental well-being (including liberty of the mind) of
the hapless men taken prisoner.
However, there is a gap between the statements embodied in the
treaty and the realities of the prison compound. In the international
conflicts in which the United States and other states have been involved
since 1949, such as Korea and Vietnam, the Convention has not been
fully honored. The violation of its principles results in part from the lack
of an international body with jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations
of the treaty. Without recourse to such a special adjudicating body, en-
forcement of the minimum standards of the Convention must depend upon
the conscience of individual nations and the force of world public opinion.
A. Historical Background
In early history, the concept of the Prisoner of War was completely
unknown, and there was no protection against maltreatment for individuals
captured in battle. In ancient Greece, where wars were fought principally
for glory, captives, who usually became bondage-slaves, were completely
at the mercy of their captors. The victor sought the total annihilation
of the vanquished. But in ancient Rome, whose wars were generally aimed
at territorial and economic expansion, a captive voluntarily surrendering
could become a freedman enjoying a low form of civil freedom. If van-
quished in combat, the prisoner was usually enslaved.'
A more humane approach developed with the growth of the Christian
doctrines of equality and brotherhood, although, ironically, infidels and
nonbelievers were put to death. The slaughter and sale of prisoners con-
tinued into the Middle Ages. But with the growth of nationalism and na-
tional armies, the soldier came to be regarded as a servant of his govern-
ment and was not personally responsible for its actions. Further progress
was made with the introduction of the principle of ransom, such as the
ransoming of King Richard the Lion-Hearted during the Crusades, and
5. Prugh, The Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces, 56 CoLut. L. REv. 676 (1956).
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of prisoner exchanges. By the end of the Thirty Years War with the Treaty
of Westphalia (1648), the principle gained acceptance that a captive of
war was regarded to be in the custody of the enemy state, rather than the
individual captor, so that he could not be killed or enslaved. This principle
became the basis for developing a code of humanitarian treatment of
prisoners of war.
Montesquieu, in L'Esprit des Lois (1748), stated that war confers
no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing any further
harm by securing their persons. Rousseau, in Contrat Social Au Principles
de Droit Politique (1762), and Vatell, in Le Droit des Gens, expanded
this concept into the quarantine theory that the captor could only remove
the prisoner from combat.
The first international attempt to provide for the protection of war
prisoners was in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce entered into between
Prussia and the United States in 1785. In 1792, the French Legislative
Assembly entered a decree attempting to formalize humanitarian rules
governing the treatment of war prisoners.
But it was not until the American Civil War that the problem was
given thorough consideration. On April 24, 1863, the famous General
Order No. 100, written by Frances Lieber, a professor of Political Science
at Columbia University, was issued. The "order" furnished much of the
basic material for all subsequent documents dealing with this matter. The
rules there formulated were given effect in the trial, conviction, and hang-
ing of Captain Henry Wing of the Confederate Army for the cruel treat-
ment and unlawful killing of prisoners who had been in his custody at
the Andersonville, Georgia, Prisoner of War Camp. Thus, the precedent
was established that the threat of punishment for barbaric activities in-
volving treatment of prisoners of war was the method for deterring such
activities.6
Numerous multilateral international conferences were adopted during
the latter part of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth
centuries for the codification of humanitarian rules protecting prisoners
of war. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 was not ratified and did not
become effective, but it became the basis for the detailed provisions of
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which established the principle
that the treatment of prisoners of war should be analogous to that pro-
vided the troops of the detaining, or capturing, power. This "assimilation"
principle-that the rights of prisoners of war are to be as close as possible
to those of members of the Detaining Power's own forces-became an
important part of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. However, the effec-
tiveness of the Hague Regulations during World War I was materially
6. Levie, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War, 56 Am. J. INT'L L.
433 (1962); 18 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 519A (1959); KANTOR, ANDERSONVILLE (1955).
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impaired by the "general participation" clause which made its provisions
binding only between the signatories, and inapplicable in the event that
a noncontracting power became a belligerent. Germany predicated its
disregard of many of the provisions of the Hague Convention on this
ground, although the Allied powers regarded the regulations as declaratory
of customary international law and binding upon all parties to the conflict.'
In 1929, the International Committee of the Red Cross prepared a
draft convention to correct the defects of the Hague Convention, speci-
fying that its provisions were to be effective between the contracting
parties even though the Convention had not been ratified by all the
belligerents. Generally, the 1929 Convention was disregarded during
World War II by Japan in the Far East and the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe, since neither had ratified this Convention. This failure of the
Soviet Union was used as an excuse for a German decree issued on Sep-
tember 8, 1941, by General Reinecke stating that the humanitarian rules
relative to the treatment of prisoners of war would not be applied to Soviet
prisoners. Accordingly, Soviet prisoners were starved, tortured, and shot
during the winter of 1941-1942. German Admiral Canaris protested
against this treatment in a memorandum to German General Keitel, who
replied that, "the objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous
warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore, I approve and
back the measures." These gross departures from minimum international
standards of conduct constituted a major part of the indictments against
the Germans before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
in 1945-1946 and the Japanese before the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East in Tokyo in 1946-1947.
The inadequacies and deficiencies of the 1929 Convention and the
customary rules to cope with the savagery manifested during World War
II led to the 1949 Geneva meeting and the drafting of a new convention
for the protection of prisoners of war.8 At the time of the Korean conflict
in 1950, neither the United States, Communist China, nor North Korea
had ratified the Convention, but all belligerents announced that they would
adhere to the standards of the Convention. The Chinese Communists and
North Koreans captured about 7,190 Americans while the United Nations
7. One instance of misconduct in Germany in World War I was in the case of Nurse
Edith Cavell who was captured by the Germans and charged with assisting Allied soldiers
to escape. Her trial was secret and execution immediate. The unfair nature of the proceed-
ings and unjust sentence shocked the world.
8. Three other Conventions were drafted at the time: The Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Civilian"), August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365 (effective in the United States, February 2, 1956) ; The Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field ("Field"), August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362 (effective
February 2, 1956); and the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea ("Sea"),
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363 (effective Feb. 2, 1956).
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forces took 120,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners.9 By 1962,
eighty-one states, including the United States and the Soviet Union had
ratified or acceded to the Convention." Of major interest today is the
application of the Convention to the conflict in Vietnam. Both North and
South Vietnam are signatories to the Convention, and the "National Lib-
aration Front" or Viet Cong has announced it would treat prisoners
humanely."
III. PRINCIPLES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION
A. General Provisions
The provisions of the Convention established minimum standards of
treatment for prisoners of war to ensure their well-being and accord them
the rights of due process of law. Article 1 obligates the contracting parties
"to respect and ensure respect for the present Conventions in all circum-
stances." The words, "in all circumstances," make it clear that the obliga-
tions of the Convention are unilateral, rather than reciprocal, and their
binding effect in any conflict does not depend upon the extent to which
other parties to the Convention respect their obligations thereunder. All
belligerents, regardless of their status as aggressor, or victim of aggres-
sion, must, during the pendency of a war, receive the benefit of the Con-
vention's humanitarian principles.' 2 As a corollary to this article, and
also as provided in article 13, one party to the conflict may not suspend
any of the rules as reprisal for actions taken by the other. Reprisals are
forbidden in "all cases of declared war between two or more of the 'High
Contracting Parties' even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them."
Article 2 states that the Convention shall apply to all armed conflicts,
"even if the state of war is not recognized" by one of the contracting
parties. It also expressly excludes the "general participation" clause. Non-
contracting parties are entitled to the benefits of the Convention if they
"accept and apply the provisions thereof."
Article 3 establishes certain minimum standards to regulate civil
wars, insurrections, rebellions, and other conflicts which are not of an
international character but which are essentially domestic. It states that
persons not taking part in the hostilities are to be treated humanely and
certain acts are prohibited:
9. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 519B.
10. Esgain and Solf, The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War: Its Principles, Innovations and Deficiencies, 41 N.C.L. REV. 537 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Esgain].
11. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1966.
12. Esgain, supra note 10, at n.33. "There is, however, a segment of international legal
thought which would make the rules of wartime applicable to aggressors only, and would
permit the defendors to pick and choose among the rules."
1967]
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(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kind, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of
hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment; and (d) the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions
without proper procedural guarantees for a fair trial. This article is sig-
nificant as an affirmation of the principle that "the observance of funda-
mental human rights has, insofar as it is the subject of legal obligations,
ceased to be one of exclusive domestic jurisdiction of States, and
has become one of legitimate concern for the United Nations and its
members.' 3
Article 3 is of special relevance to the conflict in Vietnam. If that
war is an internal, domestic conflict, only article 3, which requires humane
treatment for prisoners, need be adhered to and the other provisions of
the Convention do not apply to captured combatants. However, if the war
is of an international character, captured soldiers would be entitled to
prisoner of war status under article 4 dealing with international conflicts.
Considering Communism's commitment to the success of all wars of "na-
tional liberation" and the participation of United States military personnel
on a large, escalating scale, it would be unrealistic to consider the conflict
as purely domestic.' 4 The contention has been made that the war in Viet-
nam is in an intermediate category-that of an "international civil war,"
falling between the two traditional types of warfare: civil wars between
two factions within a state vying to represent the state as its government,
and wars between states in which one makes a declaration of war or com-
mences hostilities on the other. 5 Armed conflicts since 1945 may be gen-
erally characterized as "international civil wars."
13. Id. at 547-48.
14. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam,
54 DEPT. OF STATE BuLL. 474 (1966), 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 565 (1966). The memoran-
dum's argument was as follows: International law recognizes the right of individual and
collective self-defense against armed attack. South Vietnam and the United States, upon the
request of South Vietnam, are engaged in such collective self-defense. Their actions are
in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The United
States gave commitments at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to assist South Vietnam in
defending itself against Communist aggression from the North. We are also obligated under
the SEATO Treaty to the defense of South Vietnam.
Moore and Underwood in Collaboration with McDougal, The Lawfulness of United
States Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, 112 CONG. REc. 14,943 (daily ed. July 14,
1966). But a different position is taken by Standard, United States Intervention in Vietnam
Is Not Legal, 52 A.B.A.J. 627 (1966), reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 27,255 (daily ed. Oct.
20, 1966). Bertrand Russell, along with others, have conducted a mock war crimes trial
condemning the policies of American leaders in Vietnam which was criticized by Sidney
Hook, Lord Russell's War Crimes Trial, 112 CONG. REC. A5865 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1966).
Another critical analysis is Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46 B.U.L.
REv. 281 (1966).
15. Hooker and Savaston, The Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in the Viet-
namese Conflict, 5 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 243 (1965). The authors assert, at 249-50,
Those situations since the drafting of the Convention which have had the charac-
teristics of armed conflicts envisioned by Article 3 included: the British operations
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Article 3, together with articles 125 and 126, specifically provides
for the use of the International Red Cross, a neutral and impartial body,
to perform humanitarian tasks. Its effectiveness in the Vietnamese conflict
has been impaired, however, by the failure of North Vietnam and the
National Liberation Front to allow its representatives to inspect prison
conditions. 6
But regardless of whether the Vietnam conflict may be regarded as
an international war, there have been reliable reports indicating probable
violations of the Convention. Although the Viet Cong have given assur-
ances that their captives will be treated "humanely" their principal posi-
tion is that, not having signed the Convention, they are not obligated to
observe it, though as nationals of a signatory state, they should be so
obligated. An instance of mistreatment by the Viet Cong involved an
American prisoner of war Navy Lieut. (j.g.) Dieter Dengler, who was
shot down over Laos, February 19, 1966, and is alleged to have undergone
a six-month ordeal of torture and privation at the hands of his Communist
captors.17 He was reported to have been tied spread-eagle to posts in
villages, handcuffed to other Americans in close quarters at night, and by
day, tied upside down to limbs of trees. Masses of ants were spread on his
face. Guards beat him when he refused to sign statements concerning
United States "aggressors." For the first three months, he reported that
the prison diet was "good," a handful of rice each day. Then it was a
handful of rice every few days. After an escape on June 29, 1966, and
a harrowing trek through the jungle, in which his companion Air Force
Lieut. Duane Martin was killed, he was rescued by helicopter. After being
flown back to the United States, he said to the press,'" "They wanted
me-they wanted all of us-to die . . . and as I indicated, we'd rather
die free in a bush than [from] those guys not feeding us, or shooting us,
and I wanted to be free . . . . Man, it is great to be alive." However,
there have also been reports that South Vietnamese forces have tortured
their prisoners to elicit information.' 9
Article 4 defines the categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war
treatment. An individual, to be treated as a prisoner of war, must not only
in Malaya, the Hungarian Revolt of 1956, the Mau Mau movement in Kenya,
the Kantanga Rebellion, the Algerian Revolt, and the 1964 Rebellion in the Congo.
There have been violations of Article 3 by both sides in many cases. Furthermore,
each side appears to relish the publication of atrocities which are supposed to have
been committed by the other party to the military struggle. Such action is hardly
conducive to an undertaking to put the Convention into effect unilaterally, re-
gardless of the diligence with which the other party performs its Convention obli-
gations.
On July 20, 1966, Hanoi indicated trials of fliers, but no execution. Later this policy was
rescinded. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
16. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 1966, at 32.
17. UNITED STATES NEWS AND WoRLD REPORT, Sept. 26, 1966, at 26.
18. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 1966, at 65.
19. Editorial, The Nation, Sept. 6, 1965, at 109; 112 CONG. REc. 15,332 (daily ed.
July 18, 1966).
19671
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
have "fallen into the power of the enemy" but must be in one of the cate-
gories enumerated in article 4. Prisoner of war status is accorded, among
others, to (1) members of the armed forces; (2) members of volunteer
corps and militia who (a) are commanded by a person responsible for their
acts or omissions, (b) display a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable
at a distance, (c) carry arms openly, and (d) conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war; (3) persons who accompany
the armed forces without actually being members, such as war corre-
spondents, civilian supply contractors, and members of labor service units;
and (4) camp followers and inhabitants of an unoccupied territory who,
on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist
the invaders. However, members of organized resistance movements will
rarely meet the tests established by article 4 since, to accomplish their
mission, they must work secretly, wear no uniforms, conceal their weapons
and withhold their identity prior to their strike." Also, a spy's status as
a captive is, as a matter of customary laws of war, not that of a prisoner
of war.2
An individual who has taken part in hostilities, but who is not entitled
to prisoner of war status, may be treated by the capturing power as a war
criminal, subject to the laws of the detaining power. North Vietnam
threatened to try American pilots shot down over Hanoi during the
bombing raids in July, 1966, as war criminals. These threats, however,
brought sharp United States warnings that the pilots were prisoners of
war and that North Vietnam would be held responsible for their safety.
Hanoi claimed that the pilots were classified as war criminals under the
"Nuremberg Charter."2 Senator Thomas J. Dodd, 112 CONG. REc.
16,224 (daily ed. July 25, 1966), noted that no Luftwaffe pilot was tried
as a war criminal because of his participation in the bombing of London,
nor was any member of an armed force tried because he had obeyed clearly
military orders involving none of the crimes against humanity specified by
the Nuremberg Charter. He stated that the American pilots in Vietnam
were soldiers performing military duties, and the Nuremberg trials could
not be used as a precedent to justify their trial as war criminals. Following
international appeals, including pleas by United Nations Secretary Gen-
eral U Thant and Pope Paul VI to spare the lives of the United States
pilots, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh issued statements indi-
cating that the prisoners would not be tried and would be treated
humanely.23
Article 5 provides that an individual's status as a prisoner of war
20. DRAPER, THIE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS OF 1949 at 52 (1958) [Hereinafter cited as
DRAPER].
21. Id. at 66.
22. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
23. 26 FACTS ON FILE 265 (1966). N.Y. Times, July 20, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
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is vested the moment he has surrendered and is no longer capable of
resistance until his final release and repatriation.24 At the beginning of
American participation in World War I, an American commander believed
that he could condition the commencement of captivity and announced to
a group of enemy soldiers that they would not be treated as prisoners of
war until they had removed the land mines their troops had placed on the
battlefield. He was quickly overruled by his superior officers.
Article 6 provides that "no special agreements shall adversely affect
the situation of prisoners of war . . nor restrict the rights which it [the
Convention] confers upon them." Hoping that "special agreements" might
provide benefits greater than those provided by its terms, the 1929 Geneva
Convention in Article 83 has reserved to the parties the right to make such
agreements. However, the contrary result occurred and during World
War II the Vichy government in France entered into special agreements
with Germany authorizing the Germans to use French prisoners in German
war industries as "slave laborers."
Article 7 precludes the prisoner from renouncing the rights which
the Convention accords him, preventing him from returning to a civilian
status or joining the armed forces of the detaining power. Some of the
conferees considered the "right to a freedom of choice," a fundamental
right of man. But the Conference was persuaded that, in time of war,
prisoners do not in fact have the mental freedom to make a free choice.
"Broadly speaking, article 7 is significant for it recognizes protected
persons as subjects of international law with direct rights and obligations
thereunder.12 1
Articles 8 and 11 provide for the functioning of a Protecting Power
which is a neutral state entrusted by a belligerent with the protection
of its nationals who may be in the power of a capturing state. "During
World War II, the burden of acting as Protecting Powers was borne
principally by Sweden and Switzerland, which represented virtually all
belligerents." 6 No Protecting Power was appointed for United Nations
prisoners during the Korean War. The functions of a Protecting Power
include, among others, "the transmission of correspondence and informa-
tion, the inspection of facilities, the supervision of the distribution of
relief, and the representation of prisoners in judicial proceedings. ' 27 If
no neutrals are available in future wars, article 10 authorizes the parties,
24. FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR 39 (1942):
It is difficult to determine the point at which an enemy individual may no longer
be lawfully attacked. Prisonership probably begins when he is no longer capable of
resistance, because he either has been overpowered or is weaponless, when he
has voluntarily and individually ceased to fight, or when his chief has surrendered
his command.
25. Esgain, supra note 10, at 564.
26. Id. at 565 n.100.
27. Id. at 565.
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by agreement, to entrust such functions to an organization "which offers
all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy." 2
B. General Protection of Prisoners of War
Part II of the Convention provides for the general protection of
prisoners of war. Articles 12 to 16 reaffirm the basic principle that pris-
oners of war are in the hands of the Detaining Power and not in those
of the individual soldiers or military units who have captured them. They
must be treated humanely. Any acts by the Detaining Power causing
death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war are pro-
hibited.29 No prisoner may be subjected to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments not justified by his medical needs."0
His honor and person must be respected.31 He must be protected against
acts of violence or intimidation and against insults or public curiosity. 2
28. DRAPER, supra note 20, at 58, states: "So great a reliance has been placed upon the
role of the ...Protecting Power that the admission ... that there may be circumstances
in which there will be no protecting power gives cause for alarm." Draper contends that a
serious defect of the Geneva Convention of 1949 is that it was framed on the classical
assumption that modern armies are natural entities, whereas in our modern age it is more
common to have different national contingents of troops operating under a unified com-
mand such as the United Nations or NATO.
29. Murder is the offense against prisoners of war most frequently punished in the
past, and it constituted a war crime under customary international law even before the
Convention. Levie, supra note 6, at 446 n.50, itemizes cases of inhuman treatment which
occurred during World War II-death marches, tying prisoners of war to posts and beating
them, forced marches with inadequate supplies, flogging, and overworking.
30. J. PICTET, THE COMVIENTARY OF THE INTER-NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
40 (deHeney trans. 1960):
The authors of the Convention wished expressly to prohibit mutilation and
medical experiments which are a particularly reprehensible form of attack on the
human person. This prohibition is also included in Article 130. The intention was
to abolish forever the criminal practices inflicted on thousands of persons during
the Second World War.
[Hereinafter cited as PICTET].
31. Id., at 144-45:
Respect for the person goes far beyond physical protection and must be under-
stood as covering all the essential attributes of the human person . . . .Captivity
restricts the blossoming of personality more than any other mode of life, but its
harmful effects must not exceed the hardship imposed by captivity itself ....
The Convention contains no express reference to freedom of opinion; and yet this
right, which is one of the fundamental elements of personality, may be threatened
today because of the ideological nature of conflicts, either by those who guard
the prisoners, if the Detaining Power endeavors to weaken the morale of detain-
ees or to win them over to its cause, or by their own fellow prisoners.
See later discussion of Article 17. At p. 145, PICTET states:
The sentiment of honour is one of the factors of personality . . . . [The
prisoner of war] must be protected against libel, slander, insult and any violation
of secrets of a personal nature, and they must be so protected not only vis-a-vis
their guards, but also (although this is sometimes more difficult to achieve)
vis-a-vis their fellow prisoners.
32. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1966, at 3, col. 1, stated that it was charged that North Viet-
nam had violated Article 13 of the convention which provides that prisoners of war be
protected against intimidation, insults and public curiosity by parading captured American
pilots through the streets of Hanoi to the angry shouts and jeers of the populace.
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He must be provided with maintenance free of charge; 3 and, subject to
considerations of age, sex, rank, and health, they must be treated alike
without adverse distinctions based on race, nationality, religion or political
belief. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited. Fur-
thermore, since the ultimate responsibility for the proper treatment of
war prisoners is on the captor state, a transfer of prisoners to other powers
may be made only if the transferee power is a contracting party and is
willing to apply the rules of the Convention. 4
C. Specific Provisions concerning Captivity-Internment,
Quarters, Food and Clothing, Hygienic and Medical Attention
Part III of the Convention, Articles 17 to 108, is replete with pro-
hibitions placed upon the Detaining Power and its personnel in the treat-
ment of prisoners of war, all designed to ensure due process for such
prisoners. A few of these will be considered.
Article 17 provides that every prisoner of war, when questioned, is
bound to give only his name, rank, date of birth, and serial number. 5
"No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever." Nations have always accepted interrogation of prisoners of
war as a lawful action by a captor nation; and if a prisoner chooses to
betray his country, there is no violation of the Convention unless illegal
This affirmative duty of protection of a Detaining Power was violated during World
War II in which there were numerous instances of civilians being permitted to commit
acts of violence upon prisoners of war without any attempt being made to protect them
by those in whose custody they were. Allied airmen forced to land in Germany were
sometimes killed by the civilian population, and the police were instructed not to interfere
with these killings. Levie, supra note 6, at 453.
33. PICTET, supra note 30, at 53, states on the question of maintenance:
Can a Power legitimately plead that it is impossible for it to provide prisoners
with the minimum maintenance required by the Convention? In our view, the
reply to this question must be in the negative. If the Detaining Power is unable
or unwilling to fulfill its obligations with respect to maintenance, it should no
longer detain prisoners of war. The treatment accorded to the armed forces of
the Detaining Power is not a determining factor, since in general the principle of
assimilation comes second to standards which are expressly laid down.
34. Id. at 135:
Whether the case involves a coalition of States, an international armed force
or any other organization within which military personnel of several States fight
side by side, one general principle prevails; whenever it is impossible or difficult,
for any reason to determine which is the State which has captured a prisoner of
war and consequently is responsible for him, this responsibility is borne jointly
by all the States concerned . . . . There must be no possibility for a group of
States which are fighting together to agree to hand over to one of their members
not a party of the Convention all or some of the prisoners whom they have cap-
tured jointly, thus evading the application of the Convention.
The United States has been criticized for handing its prisoners of war over to the South
Vietnamese government for internment. But since South Vietnam is a party to the Con-
vention, there is no violation of our duty in this respect.
35. Identity cards for prisoners of war are also provided for, the intention being that
at no time shall a prisoner be without means of identification.
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means were used by the interrogators.8 However, during the Korean con-
flict the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces used "brainwash-
ing" techniques on captured United Nations' personnel. 7 Prisoners were
coerced into giving information of military value or to confessing to acts
of bacteriological warfare. The brainwashing by the Communists did not
make many converts, but it did achieve propaganda advantages, especially
among the uncommitted Asian nations. The purpose of the Communists
was to use prisoners of war to further their interests and to extend the
battlefield into the prisoner of war compound. Apparently, the prisoner
of war was to be still considered a combatant and not removed from the
battlefield. "If this apparent trend were to continue it would seriously
threaten the improved conditions of prisoners afforded by the Geneva
Conventions.""8
Article 38, providing that a Detaining Power shall "encourage the
practice of intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits, sports and
games amongst prisoners .... ." may provide a legal basis for programs
of indoctrination to encourage prisoners to change their political outlook.
An "educational" program could be construed as a program of political
indoctrination, rather than the mere encouragement of intellectual diver-
sion. During World War II, the United States developed an educational
36. Gardner, Coerced Confessions of Prisoners of War, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 528
(1956):
The United States estimates that 6,000 American prisoners of war [in the Korean
conflict] died from starvation, exposure due to inadequate clothing, beatings or
the physical and mental abuse of being kept in solitary confinement in pits, boxes
or small cells. Prisoners were terrorized repeatedly by being placed before mock
firing squads. Solitary confinement was used in conjunction with cunning psychologi-
cal techniques.
Id. at 532-33.
Two United States soldiers, Sgt. George Smith and Sgt. Claude McClure, were captured
by the Viet Cong in 1965, held prisoner for two years, and upon their release were charged
by a military tribunal, in November, 1965, with "furnishing and delivering to the Viet
Cong certain documents, statements and writings inimical to the United States' interest."
25 FACTS ON FILE 491 (1965). However, in April, 1966, they were cleared of the charges
of having aided the enemy after claiming that they had been "brainwashed." 26 FACTS ON
FiLE 148 (1966).
37. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 520. See also Prugh, Prisoners at
War: The POW Battleground, 60 DIcK. L. REV. 123 (1956), which states that the rioting
of Communist prisoners in the Koje-Do and Cheju-Do compounds and the holding of an
American general captive were part of the Communist plan to make the prisoner of war a
prisoner at war. Throughout the violence and rioting of the compounds, the Communists
hoped to influence negotiations at the truce talks.
The fight had been continued and the war extended even where the representatives
of one side were the captor and the other side the captive. Id. at 131.
38. The Geneva Convention makes no reference to the standard of conduct which a
belligerent may require of its own personnel who may become prisoners; and to remedy
this, the President on Aug. 20, 1955, issued Exec. Order No. 10631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057
(1955), prescribing a six-point Code of Conduct for members of the armed forces of the
United States. The Order defined the rules governing United States soldiers' deportment
in the unfortunate event of capture. All of the Code provisions were designed with the
realization that they would be subject to and consonant with the Geneva Conventions.
Note, Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean
Cases, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 709 (1956).
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program to create among prisoners of war detained within the United
States an understanding of American ways of life and to make them
sympathetic to America after their repatriation.
Under article 23, prisoners of war must receive shelter from air
bombardment to the same extent as the local, civilian population. This
is an instance where local, national standards, not absolute ones, are
used as a basis for protection of prisoners. There is some fear that North
Vietnam might place American prisoners of war in areas where American
bombs might drop, causing them to be killed by their own forces. 112
CONG. REC. 15,311 (daily ed. July 18, 1966). In contrast to this, article
26, providing that "the basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in
quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health..."
does not follow the principle of assimilating the treatment of prisoners
of war to those of the forces of the Detaining Power. Western soldiers
could not stay healthy on the diet of dried fish and rice customary for
Oriental men.
Articles 29 to 32 concern questions of hygiene and medical attention.
Monthly medical inspections are required, including a record of the weight
of each prisoner of war. Articles 34 to 37 stress the right of prisoners of
war to enjoy religious worship.
D. Discipline
By article 39, each prisoner of war camp commander must make
known the Convention's provisions to the camp staff, and he is responsible
for its application under the direction of his government. Many violations
of the 1929 Geneva Convention occurred because camp guards and pris-
oners of war were ignorant of the Convention's provisions. Article 127
provides for dissemination of the text of the Convention. Pursuant to
these articles, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the
United States Forces in Vietnam, issued an order in October, 1965, that
United States soldiers were to treat captured Viet Cong guerrillas
humanely. 9 Articles 46 to 48 concerning the transfer of prisoners of war
after their arrival in camp resulted from the memory of the horrors of
the 1942 Death March at Bataan in the Philippines.
E. Labor of Prisoners of War
Articles 49 to 57 concern the conditions of labor for prisoners of
war. Article 50 enumerates the classes of work on which prisoners can be
compelled to work. By article 52, the removal of mines or similar devices
has been defined as dangerous labor in which no prisoner of war can be
39. The order was distributed to United States troops in the form of a pocket sized
leaflet and urged the soldiers not to "mistreat your prisoner, humiliate or degrade him
... . Not even a beaten enemy will surrender if he knows his captors will torture or
kill him." 25 FACTs ON FILE 43 (1965).
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compelled to work. Article 55 is of special interest since it requires the
verification of the fitness of the war prisoner for work by medical examina-
tion at least once a month.40
F. Financial Resources of Prisoners of War
The minute detail of the Convention is illustrated in articles 58 to
68 covering the subject of financial resources of prisoners of war. Article
60 fixes a monthly advance of pay. During World War I, the United States
fixed a gratuity of $3.00 a month for each prisoner of war who was paid
in commodities at post exchange prices and fixed a rate of 80 cents a day
for labor, which was credited to the accounts of the prisoners. Upon
repatriation at the end of the war, the prisoners were given certificates
of credit which were cashable in designated banks in their home
countries.4
G. Relations of Prisoners of War with the Exterior
and the Authorities
Articles 69 to 77 consider the relations of prisoners of war to the
outside world with a provision for the sending and receiving of mail and
relief shipments. One of the most bitter features of captivity is the ignor-
ance of the prisoner of conditions at home. There have been complaints
that families and dependents of American prisoners of war are experienc-
ing financial neglect and need. They are having administrative difficulties
with income tax returns and other official documents requiring the absent
soldier's signature. 112 CONG. REc. 19,820 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1966).
Articles 79 to 81 deal with the office of prisoner of war representa-
tives who may represent prisoners before the Detaining Power's military
authorities. Article 78 establishes the right of prisoners to complain of
violations of the Convention by the Detaining Power. As many requests
and complaints may be made as wanted; even if found to be unfounded,
they cannot give rise to punishment.
H. Sanctions
Article 85 is of significance in providing for a reversal of the treat-
ment given prisoners of war at the war crimes trials the Allies conducted
40. Levie, The Employment of Prisoners of War, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 318 (1963).
While the benefits of prisoners of war labor to a Detaining Power are patent, benefits flow-
ing to the prisoners of war themselves as a result of their use in this manner are no less
apparent. The work may increase the war potential of an enemy and yet its nationals may
return home healthier. Work is a yaluable antidote to the trials of captivity and helps
prisoners of war to preserve their bodily health and morale. Both sides will gain if the
belligerents comply with the labor provisions of the Convention.
41. Dillon, The Genesis of the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, 5 Mi ma L.Q. 40 (1950).
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after World War 1J.42 The article asserts that "prisoners of war prosecuted
under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture
shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."
The Soviet Union and other members of the Communist bloc, including
China and North Vietnam, asserted the reservation upon ratifying the
Convention, that the Convention's benefits and procedural safeguards
should not be applicable to prisoners of war tried for pre-capture offenses
as war criminals . During the Korean War, prisoners who made "con-
fessions" to the use of germ warfare found that their statements could
be used to convict them as war criminals and deprive them of their status
as a prisoner of war.
Under article 85 prisoners of war tried for war crimes have the bene-
fits of the Convention, including a right to the substantive and procedural
rights enumerated in articles 84 to 88 and 99 to 108.
Penal and disciplinary sanctions, provided for in articles 82 to 108,
are of special interest in considering the due process rights of prisoners
of war. Article 82 provides that certain offenses, which would be subject
to severe punishment if committed by troops of the Detaining Power
are, when committed by prisoners of war, to be considered as only dis-
ciplinary infractions. The reasoning is that military codes are designed
to enforce the discipline and loyalty of the armed forces, but prisoners
of war owe no loyalty to the Detaining Power, and it is unreasonable to
hold them accountable to such standards. Articles 89 and 90 establish a
disciplinary code "in miniature" which supersedes and replaces the legis-
lation of the Detaining Power." Article 91 gives full realization to the
fact that it is a prisoner's duty to his own country to effect an escape if
possible. Acts committed solely in furtherance of an escape are to be
dealt with lightly, although the prisoner can be punished more severely
if, in the course of his escape, he commits violence against life or limb,
or against public property, or commits theft for self-enrichment.
The safeguards and rules to be followed in judicial proceedings are
stated in articles 84 to 88 and articles 99 to 108. Rearranging the sequence
so as to proceed from the pre-trial to the trial to the post-trial due process
rights of prisoners of war, the following can be stated in summary:
42. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). In 1945, General Yamashita, Commander of
the Japanese forces in the Philippines, was convicted under an order which authorized
the military commission to consider depositions, affidavits, hearsay and other evidence not
admissible in either a court martial or other military proceeding. On appeal from the
denial of General Yamashita's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the procedural safeguards of the United States Articles of
War and the Geneva Convention of 1929 were intended to apply only to offenses committed
by prisoners of war subsequent to their capture. The rationale of the Yamashita case became
a precedent for the international military war crimes trials. Article 85 makes it clear that
a reversal of that doctrine was intended.
43. 112 CONG. REc. 15,332 (daily ed. July 18, 1966) for text of the Soviet reservation.
44. PIsCET, supra note 30, at 439-40.
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As a jurisdictional matter, the Protecting Power, the pris-
oner's representative, and the accused prisoner of war must
receive a specification of the charge and notice of the time and
place of trial at least three weeks in advance thereof. Article 104.
A prisoner of war may be tried only by a military court, unless members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power may be tried by civil courts
for the offense charged, and the court must be one offering the essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality. Article 84. He must be tried
by the same courts and according to the same procedure as are members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. Article 102. He may not
be tried or sentenced for having committed an act which was not for-
bidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law in force
at the time the act was committed, and he must be afforded an oppor-
tunity, with the assistance of qualified counsel, to present a defense.
Article 99. He has the right to defense counsel, a competent interpreter,
if necessary, particulars of the charge, time to prepare his defense, oppor-
tunity to consult with his counsel freely and privately, opportunity to
confer with defense witnesses, and normally the presence of represen-
tatives of the Protecting Power at the trial (article 105) (if the trial
is not in camera for reasons of national security). He may only be
sentenced to those penalties provided for in respect to members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power who have been convicted of the
same offense; and the court must take into consideration the fact that
the accused prisoner of war is not bound by any duty of allegiance to
the Detaining Power and is its prisoner as a result of circumstances beyond
his control. Article 87.
After the trial, notice of the judgment and sentence and
appellate rights of the prisoner of war as well as his decision to
use or waive his appellate rights must be reported immediately
to the Protecting Power, to the prisoner's representative, and
to the prisoner of war himself in a language he understands, if
he wasn't present when the sentence was pronounced; and, if
the sentence has become final, or, if the death sentence has been
adjudged additional detailed information must be furnished the
Protecting Power. Article 107.
The convicted prisoner of war is entitled to the same appellate rights
as are members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and he must
be fully informed of those rights. Article 106. He retains, even if con-
victed of a pre-capture offense, all of the benefits of the Convention.
Article 85. He may not be tried twice for the same offense. Article 86.
The death sentence may not be executed until six months after notifica-
tion thereof has been given to the Protecting Power. Article 101. Sen-
tenced prisoners of war may not receive more severe treatment that that
applied in respect of the same punishment to members of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power. Article 88. Sentences and confinement must be
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served in the same establishments and under the same conditions as in
the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, which
conditions must conform to the requirements of health and humanity.
The prisoner of war retains his rights to make complaints concerning the
conditions of his confinement, and to receive the visits of the representa-
tives of the Protecting Power. Article 108." In addition, pre-trial con-
finement must not exceed three months and the period spent in pre-trial
confinement must be deducted from any sentence of imprisonment passed
upon the prisoner and be taken into account in fixing any other penalty.46
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION
The execution of the Convention and Sanctions for "grave breaches"
are specified in articles 129 and 130. Under article 129, each party to
the Convention, whether or not a belligerent, places itself under an obli-
gation to search out persons alleged to have committed any grave breach,
bring such person to trial, or, if it prefers, to turn the person over to
another party for trial where such party has made out a prima facie case
against him. Each party also undertakes to enact "any legislation neces-
sary to provide effective penal sanctions." Thus, violations of the Con-
vention are not to remain unpunished and neutral countries cannot offer
sanctuary to persons violating the Convention. To date, only a few states
have enacted legislation to implement article 129." 7 The United States
believes its existing military law, the United States Penal Code, and state
criminal laws are adequate to fulfill its obligations under the Convention.
[However, there are two objections to this view: (1) Under United States
law, its legislation is limited to offenses committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, and (2) treaties require legislative
enactment to make their provisions effective and are considered by United
States courts as being enforceable only after the enactment of such legis-
lation. Retroactive or ex post facto prohibitions are respected.]
Article 130 lists the following grave breaches: "wilful killing, torture
or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner
of war to serve in the forces of the hostile power, or wilfully depriving
the prisoner of war of the rights of a fair and regular trial .... 1s The
45. Levie, supra note 6, at 458-59.
46. PICrET, supra note 30, at 475, states:
In any case of doubt which might be to the disadvantage of prisoners of war,
these provisions (which are imperative and are contained in Articles 82 to 108)
must outweigh the corresponding legislation of the Detaining Power, and the
latter must in any event afford as a minimum the safeguards specified in the Con-
vention. The rules of the Convention, therefore, outweigh the principle of
assimilation of prisoners of war to the armed forces of the Detaining Power.
47. Esgain, supra note 10, at 582, states that eight nations-the Netherlands, Switzer-
land, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Ethiopia, Thailand and the United Kingdom-
have such legislation giving the universal jurisdiction contemplated by the Convention.
48. Numerous instances of the commission of grave breaches enumerated in article 130
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criticism has been made that many types of misconduct deserving severe
punishment are considered non-grave breaches, and nations need only use
administrative rather than legislative sanctions to punish such breaches.
In a text on Soviet Law and Procedures4" it is noted that: "An examination
of the reports of the war crime trials after World War II discloses that
numerous accused were tried and convicted for the following serious
offenses which, if committed now, would be non-grave breaches under the
1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention: (a) the use of prisoners of
war for prohibited classes of work, such as the construction of fortifica-
tions on the front lines; (b) the compulsory use of prisoners for unload-
ing arms and ammunition from military aircraft; (c) the compulsory
employment of prisoners in the production of armament; (d) the com-
pulsory employment of prisoners in unhealthy conditions; (e) the
utilization of unsanitary or inadequate housing facilities for prisoners;
(f) the giving of false information to the protecting powers concerning
the conditions of prisoners of war; (g) exposing prisoners to public
humiliation; (h) abandoning responsibility for the protection of prisoners
by transferring them to unauthorized civilian organizations; and (i) the
infringement of the religious rights of prisoners."
V. PRISONER FREEDOM
Termination of captivity and repatriation are considered in articles
109 to 119. After the Korean conflict, the Communists insisted that all
prisoners of war be repatriated, by force, if necessary. They argued that
under article 7 providing for the nonrenunciation of rights and article 118
providing for repatriation without delay all prisoners must be repatriated
regardless of their wishes. But the United Nations General Assembly on
December 3, 1952, adopted a Resolution asserting that the forcible repatri-
ation of prisoners who, because of fear of punishment for ideological
reasons reject repatriation, would be incompatible with the spirit of the
Geneva Convention. The doctrine of nonforcible repatriation means
simply that asylum may be granted by a Detaining Power to prisoners
of war who seek it.
To sum up, the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war sets high
standards of treatment for such prisoners. However, no international con-
vention can be drafted so as to preclude those who are intent on violating
its principles from so doing if they believe the violations are necessary
to attain their goals in an armed conflict. This problem of the enforcement
came to light in September, 1950, when United Nations command troops moved into
territory previously held by the Communists. However, under the provisions of the
Armistice Agreement [since the Korean conflict ended in a stalemate, not a victory],
it was necessary to repatriate those individuals who deserved punishment without such
punishment.
49. Recent Reforms manifest a trend for a growing concern for individual rights in
the Soviet Union. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURES: THE RSFSR CODES,
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS (1966).
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of proper treatment of prisoners of war may have its greatest impact in
the ideological "cold war" which the world is fighting today for men's
minds. Despite their ratification of the Geneva Convention, the Chinese
and Soviet bloc's standards regarding due process and human rights differ
from those prevailing in the West.' Lacking an international criminal
court to enforce the sanctions of the Convention, the best deterrent to the
mistreatment of captured prisoners is reliance upon the arousing of world
opinion through publication of the violations and breaches of the Con-
vention and full adversary proceedings in a special tribunal as herein
proposed.
VI. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WORLD HABEAS CORPUS
FOR PRISONERS OF WAR
An International Tribunal empowered to hear the writs of World
Habeas Corpus should be impartial and objective. Ideally, the judges
should be persons who have severed all of their national ties and are, so
to speak, citizens of the world. Indeed, if the International Court of Justice
is to evolve into a truly effective institution for the rule of law in the
international community, it must be composed of such persons. Unfor-
tunately, no such international tribunal exists today and qualified persons
who are devoid of national ties cannot be readily found. Though an
individual may profess to be fair minded, if he expects to return to live
among his own countrymen, he may be influenced by his national ties
when serving on a tribunal which decides a matter wherein the inter-
ests of his own nation are involved. This has been the situation with regard
to decisions by the International Court of Justice.
Since the judges of the International Tribunal are unlikely to be
above all nations, the Tribunal, to assure a degree of objectivity, should
contain representatives of the belligerents along with neutral representa-
tion. The Tribunal could be organized on either a stand by or ad hoc
basis to meet the juridical needs of each armed conflict. The judges would
consist of nationals of the belligerent states who would, by mutual agree-
ment, designate a certain number of nationals from neutral states to serve
with them. In the case of a civil war, the Tribunal would contain repre-
sentatives of the opposing factions. Where the conflict is characterized
as a United Nations police action or is undertaken under the authority of,
or to implement, a Security Council or General Assembly Resolution, the
Tribunal would consist of United Nations representatives-who would,
generally, be nationals from those states who have committed units to the
military action-and representatives from the State or States against
which the action has been undertaken. The total number of neutral repre-
sentatives on the Tribunal could equal the number of belligerent
representatives.
50. Esgain, supra note 10, at 591.
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Each case involving the rights of a prisoner would be heard by a
panel consisting of a national from his home country or of the unit to
which he had been attached when he was captured, a representative of
the Detaining Power, and a Neutral. The panels under the aegis of the
Red Cross would travel to the prison compounds, and other areas where
prisoners are being held, to hear the petitions, and the prisoners would
be given the right to counsel, interpreters, present evidence, cross examine
witnesses, and conduct investigations. An appeal could be made to the
Tribunal meeting en banc by either the Detaining Power or the petition-
ing prisoner. The panel could also refer a matter for determination by the
entire Tribunal to seek clarification as to the meaning of a provision of
the Geneva Convention.
If an individual is detained during an armed conflict and is denied
prisoner of war treatment under article 4 of the Geneva Convention, he
could petition by Writ of World Habeas Corpus to the Tribunal to deter-
mine his status. Thus, for example, the American fliers who were taken
prisoner by the North Vietnamese and were threatened with being tried
as war criminals could petition the Tribunal to determine their status.
A prisoner would also have the right to invoke the Writ of World
Habeas Corpus where the detaining power refuses to provide him with
humane treatment as provided in articles 17 and 18 of the Convention. If
he were subjected to torture, brainwashing, starvation, inadequate medical
and hygienic facilities, forced or dangerous labor, or the denial of repre-
sentatives to whom they may present grievances, he could invoke the
Writ to assert his rights.
The Writ of World Habeas Corpus would also be available to protect
the prisoner's rights in the application of the penal and disciplinary pro-
visions under articles 82 to 108. Where he is punished under proceedings
which are not in accord with the procedures to assure due process under
articles 84 to 88 and 99 to 108 which provide that the accused prisoner
of war receive a specification of the charge, notice of the time and place
of trial, time to prepare defense, to be heard by an independent court, to
have counsel, present evidence, and have the right of appeal, he would be
entitled to petition by Writ of World Habeas Corpus to free him from what
would constitute an illegal detention and to restore to him his full rights
as a prisoner of war. The Writ could also stay the imposition of the death
penalty. The prisoner could also invoke the Writ to assure that, as pro-
vided in article 88, he is not given a more severe punishment than would
be the case for members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. He
could also use the Writ if, as provided by article 108, he is denied the
rights to make complaints concerning the conditions of his confinement
and to receive the visits of the Protecting Power.
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The presence of an International Tribunal would be particularly
useful in implementing articles 129 and 130 which impose an obligation
upon each party to the Convention to search out persons alleged to have
committed a grave breach, to bring them to trial or to turn them over to
another party for trial where such party has made a prima facie case
against them. Generally, such persons are brought to trial if they have
been identified with the defeated belligerent and are tried by a tribunal
which has been established by the victors, though there have been excep-
tions. To assure justice, such persons regardless of nationality should be
tried by an International Tribunal. If, however, they are to be tried by
a national tribunal, they should have the right to petition the International
Tribunal by the Writ of World Habeas Corpus to review the proceedings.
If a system of World Habeas Corpus is to be instituted to protect prisoners
of war, article 130 should specify that a refusal to comply with a directive
of the International Tribunal, whether issued by a panel or en banc, would
constitute a "grave breach."
The International Tribunal could, by Writ of World Habeas Corpus,
hear petitions determining the rights of prisoners to repatriation or to
protection from forcible repatriation, thus resolving the controversy which
prolonged the truce negotiations and hostilities in the Korean conflict.
Of particular concern to the International Tribunal would be article
85 regarding prosecution of prisoners by the Detaining Power for acts
committed prior to their capture. Thus, a prisoner could be tried for war
crimes. By the Writ of World Habeas Corpus, he could not only assure
that the proceedings against him would be in accord with the substantive
and procedural rights which are enumerated in the Convention but also
seek a determination as to what would constitute a war crime and the
extent to which the defense of superior orders may be asserted. If a
prisoner has committed grave breaches of the Convention, genocide, or
mass murder, he may be justly tried, though such matters should be
heard before an International Tribunal. However, war crimes are usually
regarded as encompassing activities which are beyond the scope of usual
military actions. But the technology of modern war has created weapons
which are so destructive that a case could be made that their use is
criminal. The author of the controversial play, The Deputy, has con-
tended that the allied fliers who bombed the City of Dresden during
World War II committed an act which was as criminal as that perpetrated
by the Nazi officiers at the Warsaw Ghetto.5' An argument can be made
that the use of thermonuclear weapons would constitute a war crime. A
bombardier who dropped ) an atomic bomb; a technician who turned the
switch to release a missile with a thermonuclear warhead; and a com-
mander who ordered the use of thermonuclear missiles may be held
51. Hochuth, The Slaughter of Innocents, PLAYBoY, January 1966, at 153.
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accountable for their acts, even though the purpose was to achieve certain
military objectives. The mere fact that the accused acted in obedience
to the orders of a superior does not of itself relieve him from responsi-
bility.52 But the problem still remains as to the point at which an individ-
ual is to be held responsible for his acts and as to which acts are to be
regarded as constituting war crimes.
In determining the status of persons as prisoners of war, the Inter-
national Tribunal may be called upon to consider such questions as
whether a state of war actually exists and, conceivably, whether a state,
in engaging in military actions, is acting in accord with the principles of
international law. However, given the present state of international rela-
tions, states will be reluctant to confer such authority on an International
Tribunal, particularly regarding the latter question. But if a belligerent
should seek to try a prisoner of war as an "aggressor" or perpetrator of
aggressive war, or for allegedly committing criminal acts, and he appeals
by Writ of World Habeas Corpus to the Tribunal, it may well be con-
fronted with this question. In determining the issue, the Tribunal may
be making a judicial determination of the dispute which had precipitated
the conflict. Thus, the extension of World Habeas Corpus to prisoners of
war could be a major step toward the replacement of war as a means for
resolving disputes with the rule of law.
In using law to make war more humane, the individual has been
recognized as having certain rights and responsibilities. By commencing
to protect these rights in time of war, a precedent was established which
extended to the protection of human rights in peace time. But, if these
rights, now recognized by international law, are to be effective, the individ-
ual must have the means for asserting his rights before an International
Tribunal. The remedy recognized by most legal systems for a denial of
individual rights is the Writ of World Habeas Corpus which can provide
an individual with access to an International Tribunal where a municipal
authority has denied him fundamental rights. This remedy is particularly
suitable in implementing the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949
on Prisoners of War.
International law has conferred rights and responsibilities upon
individuals who have become prisoners of war. World Habeas Corpus
emerges as the effective remedy for giving effect to these rights. The need
for limiting the scope of international conflict because of the dangers of
mutual annihilation requires adherence to the rules of warfare by all
belligerents. The presence of an International Tribunal to implement
some of these rules can serve as a further mechanism to limit the scope
52. One writer contends that what should really be probed in these cases is the mens rea
of the accused. DINsEIN, THE DEFENCE OF 'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1965).
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and intensity of armed conflict. The functioning of such a tribunal can
be a step toward the establishment of the rule of law as a means for
resolving international disputes.
VII. CONCLUSION: A WORLD HABEAS CORPUS TRIBUNAL
A basic step in mankind's continuing struggle toward achieving
human dignity will be for the nations of the world to develop an effective
means of protecting prisoners of war from cruel and inhuman treatment
during their wartime confinement."' A serious procedural defect in the
Geneva Convention's machinery for enforcing its provisions is the lack
of a permanent, impartial international tribunal with power to consider
petitions for writs of habeas corpus by, or on behalf of, individual pris-
oners of war.54 In the past, the only real deterrent to abuse of such
prisoners has been the fear of punishment at the end of hostilities, should
the offending nation be the loser. The Nuremberg trials have been criticized
on these grounds, as being principally the meting out of punishment by
the victors on the vanquished.55
53. In HINGORANI, supra note 4, the author, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University
of Gorakhpur, states:
A person's liberty may have been temporarily curtailed due to the incidence of
war, but he doesn't lose his right to life and security of person, including immunity
from torture or cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Id. at 226.
54. A writ of habeas corpus is "a writ issued by a judge or court of justice com-
manding the person to whom it is directed to bring the body of a person in his custody
before that or some other court for a specified purpose. [It is a] well-established remedy
for violation of personal liberty." 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITArNicA 55 (1959).
The writ of habeas corpus is limited in that it can only be used against unlawful
imprisonment. However, imprisonment involving cruel and inhuman treatment is by its
nature unlawful as being in derogation of the natural rights of man.
55. Bridges, The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and the Formula-
tion of International Criminal Law, 13 INT'L L.Q. 1255 (1964). The author states that
although international crimes are infrequently committed in peace time, ad hoc tribunals are
undesirable.
However impartial and incorruptible members of an ad hoc tribunal might in fact
be, the mere fact that the tribunal had been set up expressly to try crimes arising
out of particular circumstances would suggest, however unjustly, that the tribunal
is not impartial, that the matters to be tried have been prejudged and that the
tribunal has been set up to give a false impression that justice is being done.
Id. at 127.,
OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 586 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952) states:
[Aissuming the possibility of a legal [regulation of war in conditions of modern]
warfare-which assumption is still part of international practice-the establishment,
in advance, of an impartial international judicial organ for that purpose, open to all
belligerents and to neutrals, is a requirement both of justice and of the effectiveness
of International Law . . . . Undoubtedly there is a distinct possibility that in any
major or general war a judicial authority thus created may be swept away by the
victor. But there is equally no doubt that he would not be able to do this without
exposing himself to the irrebuttable accusation that his attempt to punish war
crimes in his own way is no more than a pretext for wreaking vengeance upon the
defeated or that he himself has been guilty of war crimes likely to be condemned by
an impartial tribunal.
In addition, dangerous precedents can be established when an individual state kidnaps a
criminal and tries him before its own national courts, as in the case of Eichmann.
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Establishment of an International Court of Habeas Corpus under
United Nations auspices (but autonomous and independent of the political
influences of that organization), by treaty between the nations of the world
would afford individual prisoners of war the procedural means and forum
to protest treatment violating their fundamental human rights.56 Recourse
to an international body is necessary since it is highly dubious that a
belligerent state would punish its own nationals for such violations. On
the contrary, the sort of crimes committed during World War II and the
Korean conflict indicate that such mistreatment has been tacitly approved,
if not actively stimulated and encouraged, by capturing nations for the
achievement of their military or political purposes.57 The availability of
an International Writ of Habeas Corpus would do much to ensure in-
creased respect and observance of the standards of the Geneva Conven-
tion."8 Violators could expect to face international accountability for their
misdeeds during the progress of the conflict. Prisoners would not feel
helpless and powerless against continuing cruelty and suffering with their
only hope being escape or their country's quick victory.
In addition, in this area the proposed Writ of World Habeas Corpus
would not encounter the delicate problem of allowing an individual to
sue his own state before an international body, with the consequent
deterioration of the allegiance relationship between that citizen and his
state. The Writ would be used principally when a signatory state has
mistreated a captured citizen of another state, involving no violation of
the doctrine of state sovereignty. Breaches of the Geneva Convention are,
by definition, international crimes against mankind, and the power to try
56. Kutner, A Proposal for a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus and an Inter-
national Court of Human Rights, 28 TUL. L. REV. 417 (1954); Kutner, World Habeas
Corpus for International Man: A Credo for International Due Process of Law, 36 U. DET.
L.J. 235 (1959) ; Kutner, The Case for An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Reply,
37 U. DET. L.J. 605 (1960) ; Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: A Legal Absolute for Survival,
39 U. DET. L. J. 279 (1962); KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS: A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE UNITED NATIONS WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(1960) ; Kutner and Carl, An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: Protection of Personal
Liberty in a World of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 469 (1961).
Fisher, International Habeas Corpus, reprinted in G. MUELLER & E. WISE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL. LAW, 509 (1965), states that he believes the draft for an international writ of
habeas corpus "helps bring into focus some of the issues that must be faced in any effort
to raise the standards of fairness and justice with which all governments treat their own
citizens and others."
57. HINGORANI, supra note 4; Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court,
46 Am. J. INT'L L. 60, 71 (1952).
58. Articles 78 to 81 of the Geneva Convention dealing with the right of prisoners to
be heard should be amended to include their right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Article 129 should also be so amended.
Past history indicates that the decisions of international tribunals have been complied
with without the need of extrinsic systems of enforcement, the great moral force of world
public opinion being sufficient.
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and punish international criminals belongs to international society and
not individual states. 9
Most modern authorities on international law consider individuals as
subjects and not objects of international law.60 As subjects of international
law-as active international personalities-prisoners of war should have
available the right, through the representative Protecting Power or the
International Committee of the Red Cross, to petition for the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, "the great shield of human liberty." If the Writ is
granted, the Detaining Power would produce the prisoner before the
regional court of World Habeas Corpus, and the court would then pro-
ceed to determine whether the prisoner's detention involved conditions
contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention or shocking to the
conscience of mankind."' States could no longer ratify the Convention
and then not fulfill its provisions, claiming good faith; their actions would
be subject to review by an international tribunal. The world community
could no longer ignore or condone abuse of captured men who had simply
performed military services for their own states.62
On December 12, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations
designated the year 1968 as the Year for Human Rights for the purpose
of commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A committee has been estab-
lished to recommend a program in furtherance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. As part of this program, it would be opportune for the
international community to consider the establishment of a World Court
of Habeas Corpus. A resurgence of interest in the creation of such a
tribunal is to be expected. It should be noted that public outrage at
the mistreatment of prisoners of war could arouse national indignations
which would then hinder peaceful solutions to a war. The door would be
opened to a nuclear holocaust and the complete dehumanization of war-
59. U. UDOiWfA, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS states: "The right to life and liberty of the
individual in the States is of such fundamental importance that its enforcement should
not be allowed to be controlled entirely by individual States."
60. M. ST.KOROWICZ, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1959). The author
proposes that the International Court of Justice should not be engaged in the settlement
of disputes between individuals and states, but should only have jurisdiction over disputes
between international organizations and states. He believes that special regional or universal
tribunals should settle cases arising between individuals and foreign states or international
organizations, i.e., the European Commission on Human Rights.
HiNGoRANI, supra note 4, at iii, states: "Gradually, the individual has been transformed
'from an object of international compassion into a subject of international right.'"
61. HINGORANI, supra note 4, at viii, states that many of the provisions of the Geneva
Convention are out of date and fail to take account of many of the problems facing the
detaining power under conditions of modern warfare. It could be disastrous if they become
so anachronistic as to be of no effect as a guide to rights and privileges of prisoners.
62. But where it is possible to meet the standards of the Convention and where a
belligerent fails to do so, then there is jurisdiction for international sanction. Their basic
philosophy grounded on a belief in human dignity is still valid.
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fare. It is thus very necessary to provide prisoners of war with an effective
means of legal recourse to prevent violations of their rights of due
process.6 3
63. In 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations invited the International
Law Commission to produce a draft statute for an International Court of Criminal Justice.
The first draft statute may be found in the Official Records of the General Assembly,
Seventh Session, Supplement No. 11 (A12136). A second draft statute is in the Official
Records of the General Assembly (July 27-Aug. 20, 1953), Ninth Session, Supplement
No. 12 (A12645) and also, the Sept. 1, 1953 United Nations Bulletin, p. 193. The
International Law Commission reported that it was possible and desirable to establish
such a court. However consideration of this proposal was deferred in 1954 when the
General Assembly decided that until the related problem of defining aggression could be
resolved no further progress could be made in the creation of an international criminal court.
GA Resolution 898 (LX) 1954 and GA Resolution 1187 (XII) 1957, written analysis of
the draft statute has been "disappointingly meagre." See Parker, An International Criminal
Court: The Case for Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 641 (1952) ; Finch, An International
Criminal Court: The Case Against Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 644 (1952); Ely, Proposal
for an International Criminal Court: A Critique and an Alternative, 57 DicK. L. REv. 46
(1952). Sager, An International Criminal Tribunal in American Law, 11 How. L.J. 607
(1965) reluctantly concludes that the United States is barred from participation in such
an international tribunal by virtue of the Sixth Amendment providing for trial by jury
in "all criminal prosecutions." For a detailed analysis of the procedural and constitutional
aspects of specific articles of the drafts, see MUELLER & WIsE, supra note 56, at 526.
